The social science debate on governance implicitly or explicitly remains wedded to an ideal type of modern statehood -with full domestic sovereignty and the capacity to make, implement, and enforce decisions.
1 From a global as well as historical perspective, however, the Western modern nation state constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Outside the developed OECD world, we find areas of limited statehood that lack domestic sovereignty. Under such conditions, governance requires the inclusion of non-state actors in the provision of collective goods and the regulation of social and political issues.
Yet, our conceptual apparatus is ill-equipped to deal with the governance problematique in areas of limited statehood. The Western governance discourse is not only heavily influenced by modernization theory. It also assumes modern statehood and a fully functioning state as a background condition, if only to provide a "shadow of hierarchy." Stephen Krasner's work has opened up the debate by unpacking the concept of sovereignty and demonstrating that international, "Westphalian," and domestic sovereignty do not always go together and that there are many "varieties of sovereignty." 2 This paper focuses on a particular example that is nevertheless ubiquitous in the developing world, namely areas of limited statehood in which the state lacks authority and/or effective control, i.e. domestic sovereignty. Emphasizing governance rather than statehood then allows us to ask who is providing which rules structures and which public services under these conditions. It also allows us to look for functional equivalents to the ability of consolidated states to cast a "shadow of hierarchy" as a context for effective governance by and with non-state actors.
Governance in areas of limited statehood is multi-level governance linking inter-and transnational actors to local ones in a variety of rule and authority structures.
1 A first draft of this paper was presented at the conference honouring Stephen D. Krasner, Stanford University, Dec. 4-5, 2009 . I thank the participants for their critical comments, in particular Martha Finnemore, Judith Goldstein, Steve Krasner, and Ron Hassner. This paper is meant to contribute to an ongoing conversation with Steve that started over dinner in a lovely Italian restaurant overlooking Halensee in Berlin in early 2004 and has since led to several cooperative endeavours. Research for the paper has been carried out in the framework of the Collaborative Research Center 700 "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood," located at the Freie Universität Berlin and funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) .
My starting point is Krasner's work on sovereignty, particularly the 1999 volume (Krasner 1999) . I am particularly concerned with his attempt to unpack the concept of sovereignty by distinguishing its various components. Krasner 1999 differentiates between international (juridicial independence and mutual recognition), "Westphalian" 3 (exclusion of external actors from authority structures in a territory), domestic (organization of authority in a state and ability of authorities to exercise effective control -effective Gebietsherrschaft), as well as interdependence sovereignty (ability to control cross-border flows).
In this paper, I focus on domestic as well as "Westphalian" sovereignty. While most states in the contemporary international system enjoy international recognition, their domestic sovereignty is severely circumscribed as a result of which their "Westphalian" sovereignty is often limited, too.
In other words, "limited statehood" or sovereignty is a fact of life in the contemporary international system (and has probably always been that way). If that is the case, then governance is problematic, too. The question has to be asked: Who governs for whom, and how are governance services provided under conditions of weak statehood?
I argue in the following that limited sovereignty does not represent the end of governance.
Rather, rule-making, collective goods and services are provided by various combinations of state and non-state actors using predominantly non-hierarchical modes of steering (see Risse and Lehmkuhl 2007; Risse 2011b ). These so-called "new" modes of governance 4 are often effective even in the absence of consolidated statehood casting a credible "shadow of hierarchy." I discuss functional equivalents for such consolidated statehood of fully sovereign states.
The paper proceeds in the following steps. I first describe what "limited statehood" means.
Second, I discuss the modes of governance to be found in areas of limited statehood. Third, I dis-cuss governance problems arising in areas of limited statehood and then introduce functional equivalents to the "shadow of hierarchy" cast by consolidated statehood which insures that governance contributions by non-state actors are effective. The paper concludes with remarks on
Western attempts of exporting governance to areas of limited statehood.
Limited Sovereignty and Limited Statehood
The concept of "limited statehood" needs to be strictly distinguished from "failing" and "failed" statehood. 5 Most typologies in the literature and datasets on fragile states, "states at risk," etc. reveal a normative orientation toward highly developed and democratic statehood and, thus, toward the Western model (e.g. Rotberg 2003 Rotberg , 2004 . The benchmark is usually the democratic and capitalist state governed by the rule of law (Leibfried and Zürn 2005) . Take the OECD definition of fragile statehood, for example: "States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic function needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations" (quoted from Mata and Ziaja 2009, 5) . Such a conceptualization is analytically problematic, because it defines states by the governance services they are supposed to provide. This definition also contains a normative bias toward Western state-
hood.
Yet, we need to have an understanding of statehood before we can define "limited statehood". As usual, a good starting point is Max Weber's conceptualization of statehood as an institutionalized rule structure with the ability to steer hierarchically (Herrschaftsverband) and to legitimately control the means of violence (Gewaltmonopol, cf. Weber 1921 /1980 . While no state governs hierarchically all the time, states at least possess the ability to authoritatively make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a collectivity. In other words, states command what Kras-ner calls "domestic sovereignty," i.e., "the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity" (Krasner 1999, 4) . This definition contains two aspects, namely "authority" (Herrschaft would be the more precise German term) and "effective control." Herrschaft/authority is possible without effective control, since it can be based on the voluntary consent of those being ruled; statehood usually relies on a combination of authority and control (Krasner 1999, 10) .
This understanding allows to strictly distinguish between statehood as an institutional structure of authority, on the one hand, and the kind of governance it provides, on the other. The latter is an empirical not a definitional question. While control over the means of violence is part of the definition, it becomes an empirical question whether this monopoly over the use of force provides security for the citizens as a public good (or governance).
We can now define more precisely the notion of "areas of limited statehood." In short, while areas of limited statehood belong to internationally recognized states (even Somalia still commands international sovereignty), it is their domestic sovereignty which is severely circumscribed.
In other words, areas of limited statehood concern those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily. Areas of limited statehood can be parts of the territory (e.g. provinces far away from the national capital), but they can also be policy areas (e.g. the inability to implement and enforce environmental laws). In this understanding, areas of limited statehood are not confined to fragile, failing, or failed states the latter having completely lost their domestic sovereignty. Rather, this conceptualization implies that even otherwise fully consolidated states 6 might contain areas of limited statehood in which they do not enjoy domestic sovereignty, at least temporarily (New Orleans shortly after the hurricane Kathrina being an example).
6 Note that the opposite of limited statehood is not "unlimited statehood" in the sense of an almost totalitarian state. Rather, I would prefer to call the other end of the continuum "consolidated statehood" as an ideal typical configuration in which state authorities enjoy full domestic sovereignty over their territory or in the various policy areas. Note that limited domestic sovereignty primarily refers to a lack of capacity rather than willingness of states to enforce decisions. States often choose not to enforce the rules in some issueareas for a variety of reasons even if they could. Many authoritarian states that enjoy full domestic sovereignty, do not enforce international human rights even though they have committed to them (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002) . This is not meant by limited statehood. In other cases, rule enforcement in some parts of the territory leads to limited statehood in other parts. In the case of Mexico City or Buenos Aires, for example, city authorities are perfectly able to provide public security in the rich and wealthy quarters, but -as a result -lack the resources to protect the quarters in which the poorer parts of the population live (Braig and Stanley 2007 Data according to "Detaillierte_Werte_BTI2010.xls," downloaded from http://www.bertelsmanntransformation-index.de/bti/ranking/ . One problem of most databases on developing and transition countries including the World Bank's databases is that they do not measure "limited sovereignty" in the sense of limited statehood, but rather different degrees to which governance is provided or not. In other words, they suffer from the same modernization bias as the literature on failed and fragile states mentioned above.
with "neoliberal" statehood in the sense of deliberate decisions by national governments to withdraw from providing public services and governance in various policy areas.
Yet, since lack of domestic sovereignty is an almost ubiquitous phenomenon in the contemporary international system, this has serious consequences for the way in which we think about statehood in general. What if the modern, developed and sovereign nation-state turns out to be a historical exception in the context of this diversity of areas of limited statehood? Even in Europe, the birthplace of modern statehood, nation-states only were able to fully establish the monopoly over the use of force in the 19 th century. The globalization of sovereign statehood as the dominant feature of the contemporary international order only took place in the 1960s, as a result of decolonialization.
The world today, as an international community of states, is largely based on the fiction that it is populated by modern, i.e., fully consolidated states. International law is based on the idea of sovereign nation-states, which the international community assumes are functioning states that command "effective authority" over their territories (Schuppert and Kötter 2007; Ladwig and Rudolf 2011) . Moreover, international law and the legalization of world politics have increasingly embedded states in a net of legal and other binding obligations in almost every policy area (Goldstein et al. 2000; Zangl and Zürn 2004) . Legalization assumes that states are fully capable of implementing and enforcing the law. The international prohibition on intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign states is based on the assumption that states have the full capacity to conduct their own domestic affairs. Ironically, many developing countries where limited statehood constitutes part of the daily experience of the citizens firmly insist on their full rights as sovereign states and are adamantly opposed to any intervention in their internal affairs. In many cases, the more states lack domestic sovereignty, the more they reject any intrusion on their "Westphalian" sovereignty.
This leads me to a more thorough discussion of the governance problematique in areas of limited sovereignty and statehood.
Who Governs in Areas of Limited Sovereignty?
How is The modern (Western) nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance structure. First, it provides a structure of rule and authority, a system of political and social institutions to generate and to implement authoritative political decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the generally accepted norms of these institutions for authoritative rule-making. Second, the Western nation-state has the task to protect the internal and external security of its citizens. The monopoly over the means of violence is supposed to do just that. Finally, the rendering of public services is part of the classical responsibilities of the state, from the creation of economic stability, the guarantee of minimal social security to public health, education and, today, the maintenance and the creation of a clean environment. In short, the modern and Western nation-state provides governance in the areas of rule-making and enforcement, on the one hand, and with regard to collective goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment, on the other. While this nation-state is under- Third, the role of private companies in providing governance in areas of limited statehood must be mentioned (see Börzel et al. 2011; Flohr et al. 2010; Deitelhoff et al. 2010; Haufler 2010) .
In some cases such as the modern protectorates (e.g. Iraq or Afghanistan), companies govern on behalf of the occupation forces or the international community in the sense of delegated authority (Cooley 2010) . The more interesting cases are those in which companies provide governance more or less voluntarily, be it in the context of some transnational agreement, be it in the form of state enforcement capacity also implies that it is hard to make agreements stick and to engage in credible commitments.
In short, governance in areas of limited statehood requires providing rules, regulations, and public services in the absence of a fully functioning state whose domestic sovereignty is compromised, at least on parts of the territory or in some policy areas. In many cases, a state's "Westphalian" sovereignty is compromised, too, insofar as external actors exercise authority in such areas of limited statehood. To some degree, this situation resembles the "cooperation under anarchy" problematique of the international system (Oye 1986). As a result, we find similar mixed motive situations for the actors involved in governance. Forms of governance emerge under these conditions in areas of limited statehood which the contemporary social science literature discusses as "new" modes of governance or the privatization of authority. Institutional state weakness implies that public private partnerships (PPP) or even pure private forms of governance are becoming the rule rather than the exception, if governance services are supplied at all. While public private partnerships increasingly complement classic state functions in Western developed states, they have to substitute for state weaknesses in areas of limited statehood, be it on parts of the territory, in some policy sectors, or with regard to parts of the population.
The peculiarities of governance in areas of limited statehood create their own problems. I will now turn to these issues.
Problems of Effective Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood
The very reasons why governance in areas of limited statehood has to substitute for weak domestic sovereignty also explain that the effectiveness and problem-solving capacity of the emerging modes of governance encompassing state and non-state actors are often questionable. There is often a tendency in the literature to celebrate "new" modes of governance as a solution to the world's problems (see e.g. Reinicke 1998; Reinicke et al. 2000; Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999) .
However, it is not altogether clear whether public private partnerships (PPP) comprise part of the solution or part of the problem. For example, neo-patrimonial and clientelistic structures in large parts of Africa, but also in the southern Caucasus, often resemble such public private partnerships.
But in these cases, governance is only provided for a small part of the population, namely the members of clientelistic networks. Security, for example, might become a club good so that access to it is restricted (Chojnacki and Branovic 2011; Avant 2005) . In the worst case, state assets are Last not least, particularly multinational corporations for whom profit-making is constitutive and who are unlikely to become charities even in areas of limited statehood, face compliance problems under conditions of weak domestic sovereignty. They might have committed to transnational regulations or voluntary principles, but implementing these rules locally and complying with them is a more daunting task, particularly since there is little local enforcement (for a discussion with regard to mining companies in the Democratic Republic of Congo see Hönke 2010a; Börzel and Hönke 2010) . This might partly be a lack of willingness to comply, but in many cases, companies are faced with conflicting goals between profit-making and market pressures, on the one hand, and contributing to governance by complying with transnational rules, on the other.
In sum, we are faced with an apparent governance paradox: The more limited state capacities are to implement and to enforce decisions and to provide public services, the more governance by PPP or non-state actors is necessary to ensure at least minimum access to collective goods. At the same time, however, limited statehood itself seriously hampers the effectiveness of "new" modes of governance. Are areas of limited domestic sovereignty, therefore, doomed?
This issue is usually identified in the literature as the "shadow of hierarchy" problem (Scharpf 1993) . Research on modes of governance in the OECD world and on the transformation of (modern) statehood has demonstrated that public-private cooperation (such as PPP) and private self-regulation are usually most effective under the "shadow of hierarchy." This means that state agencies supervise private regulatory efforts and/or that governments threaten to legislate if private actors do not get their act together or do not provide the collective goods. The liberalization of various public services -such as telecommunications, electricity, and the like -has led to ample efforts at re-regulation by the modern state (see e.g. Héritier 2003; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008) . Hierarchical steering or the threat to do so appears to be a pre-condition for the successful implementation and effectiveness of modes of governance in consolidated states and beyond. In other words, non-hierarchical modes of steering and including non-state actors in governance complement rather than substitute for regulatory activities by national governments or supranational institutions such as the EU. Moreover and paradoxically, strong states or strong supranational organizations are required for non-hierarchical modes of steering to be effective and to enhance the problem-solving capacity of governance (Börzel 2009 Africa were to withdraw from fighting HIV/AIDS at their production facilities and the surrounding areas, the fight against the pandemic would be doomed there (Börzel et al. 2011; Müller-Debus, Thauer, and Börzel 2009) . In each of these examples, the central governments are far too weak to provide the collective goods in question. As a result, private actors as well as the international community substitute for rather than complement governance by the state.
These considerations mean that not only do we need functional equivalents for "governance by government" in areas of limited statehood or limited domestic sovereignty (on this concept see Draude 2008) . We also need functional equivalents for the "shadow of hierarchy" provided by consolidated statehood in order to insure the effectiveness of governance without a state.
Functional Equivalents to the "Shadow of Hierarchy"
Consolidated statehood is a prominent but not the only way to generate a shadow of hierarchy.
8
Possible alternatives can be conceptually distinguished according to the underlying logic of social action, namely whether they rely on a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness (see March and Olsen 1998) . According to the logic of consequences, self-interested and utilitymaximizing actors are likely to contribute to governance given the right incentives and/or if they are embedded in institutional settings constraining them. I discuss two alternatives to the shadow of hierarchy using the logic of consequences below, namely the risk of anarchy, on the one hand, and the involvement of external actors able to cast a shadow of hierarchy "from afar", on the other.
According to the logic of appropriateness, actors are embedded in normative structures which induce them to "do the right thing" and to follow social rules. Again, I discuss two alternatives to the shadow of hierarchy relying on this logic, namely how normative structures affect and embed markets, on the one hand, and how local community norms lead to governance. Empirically, I
mainly focus on companies as the quintessential self-interested and profit-oriented non-state actors which are, therefore, unlikely to contribute to governance per se.
The Risk of Anarchy
While the shadow of hierarchy provides a key incentive for non-state actors to engage in governance and the provision of collective goods, the same might hold true for the exact opposite, namely the absence of political order. If the state is not capable of adopting and enforcing collectively binding decisions, non-state actors face the danger that there is no governance at all. In the case of companies, for example, the pursuit of their individual self-interests often depends on the provision of certain common goods and collectively binding rules to produce them. If the state is not capable or unwilling to provide them, companies have a major incentive to step in and to provide governance in areas of limited statehood. Take, once again, the case of HIV/AIDS in South Africa (Börzel et al. 2011) : Multinational companies of the automotive industry, such as BMW, Mercedes Benz or General Motors, require skilled labour that, however, suffers from the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In the absence of a functioning public health system including public education on the risks of the pandemic, companies have been stepping in to provide health and education services not only for their workers, but also for their families and the larger communities. In this case, the firms' self-interest in human capital rather than any orientation toward the public good provides strong incentives to engage in health and education governance in the absence of a functioning state (Thauer 2009b; Müller-Debus 2010) .
The anarchy problematique in areas of limited statehood closely resembles the international system in the absence of an enforcer or hegemon. Transnational or global governance has to cope with the problem that there is no world state to insure compliance with costly rules. Rather, in the case of international regimes, individual states have to voluntarily enforce norms and rules (Krasner 1983; Rittberger 1993) Moreover, the institutionalist literature has also identified scope conditions for the provision of effective governance in world affairs. The literature on "legalization", for instance, has argued that compliance with costly rules is all the more likely, the more the norms and rules are welldefined (precision), the higher the degree of obligation and the more adjudication of compliance is referred to independent monitoring or even judicial systems (delegation; cf. Abbott et al. 2000; Zangl and Zürn 2004) . This proposition was evaluated with regard to transnational public private partnerships (PPP) providing governance to reach the United Nations Millenium goals in areas of limited statehood -and it held up pretty well against the empirical evidence, particularly in the case of service providing partnerships that involved large amounts of financial resources (Beisheim, Liese, and Ulbert 2008; Liese and Beisheim 2010; Liese and Beisheim 2010) . The more institutionalized the respective PPP, the more effective it was in contributing to public services in areas of limited statehood.
External Actors Compensating for Limited Statehood
The state is not the only one to cast a shadow of hierarchy inducing actors to provide governance on its home territory. Rather, external actors, such as international organizations and foreign gov-ernments, can commit non-state actors to participate in effective governance. First, external actors may directly interfere with a country's "Westphalian" sovereignty including the monopoly over the means of violence as well as enforcing decisions authoritatively. Prominent examples for such areas of limited statehood are the modern protectorates from Bosnia to Afghanistan. Moreover, the emerging international norm of the "responsibility to protect" can be invoked if a state is neither willing nor capable of providing even a minimum degree of governance. As a result, the international community has at least the legal right to intervene and to provide governance if everything else fails. If a state's "Westphalian" sovereignty is constrained through direct interference by the international community, external actors are the more likely to cast a credible shadow of hierarchy, the more they actually control the means of violence and the more they can effectively enforce decisions. In this case, lack of domestic sovereignty is directly substituted for by external actors who can also provide a shadow of hierarchy necessary to ensure effective governance by non-state actors.
Second, under international law, NGOs, companies, and local actors can be obliged to comply with standards of good governance in areas of limited statehood (Ladwig and Rudolf 2010) . The provision of an external authority casting a shadow of hierarchy points to the opposite mechanism as the one identified above as the "risk of anarchy." While the latter is defined by the absence of a state, the former still requires consolidated statehood, e.g. in the home country of a non-state actor. The two alternatives to domestic sovereignty may complement and actually reinforce each other. In this case then, the multi-level nature of governance in areas of limited statehood provides for a functional equivalent to consolidated statehood's ability to cast a shadow of hierarchy. Binding non-state actors to international law as well as home-country regulations do not require the formal intrusion in a state's "Westphalian" sovereignty which usually meets stiff resistance especially by weak and fragile states. Rather, the international community and/or Western consolidated states can see to it that non-state actors such as firms and NGOs engage in governance and provide public services in areas of limited statehood.
Norms and Socially Embedded Markets
To begin with, NGOs and transnational social movements often launch international campaigns naming and shaming companies who fail to contribute to the provision of common goods in areas of limited statehood. As a result, environmental and human rights norms have started to creep into the core business of many companies, particularly multinational corporations with a "brand name"
to defend and whose products target markets in (consolidated and democratic) states where consumers care about the provision of common goods (see e.g. Potoski and Prakash 2006; Prakash and Potoski 2007; Flohr et al. 2010) . What is now being called "corporate social responsibility" requires firms to integrate environmental and human rights norms into their production, management, and general business practices. In many cases, companies had been subjected to NGO campaigns including consumer boycotts. Today, more and more companies have integrated these norms into their business practices including their risk management, even though their compliance record still varies enormously. Empirical research shows in this respect that NGO campaigns are particularly effective when they target firms with a strong brand name, whereas they are much less influential when attacking firms that lack such an identity (Thauer 2009b; Börzel et al. 2011; Hönke et al. 2008; Flohr et al. 2010; Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010) .
Of course, the incorporation of environmental and human rights standards into their practices does not turn firms into charities. But companies increasingly realize that their markets are socially embedded and that their customers care about these issues. As footwear companies such as Nike learned the hard way, their American and European customers did not want to buy sneakers and running shoes produced through child labor in the Philippines. Having learned their lesson, some companies with vested interests in corporate social responsibility standards even regulate and control their supply chain to ensure a clean production (Héritier, Mueller-Debus and Thauer 2009 ). Such inspector activities are another example of a functional equivalent to the "shadow of hierarchy" cast by the threat of state regulation.
Reputational concerns about socially accepted behaviour induce firms to take norms more seriously. Norm compliance can then turn into a strategic advantage in competitive markets leading to a "race to the top" with regard to regulatory standards. A study of South African firms has documented these mechanisms (Börzel et al. 2011 ; see also Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009) . Contributing to governance then becomes a matter of self-interest, since it pays off if a firm can set the industry standard with regard to environmental or human rights standards. As Annegret Flohr et al. argue , this can actually turn firms into norm entrepreneurs (Flohr et al. 2010 ). Yet, the mechanism only works if consumers -mostly in the home countries of the multinational corporations -care about social norms and good governance in areas of limited statehood and are prepared to pay a certain price for it.
In sum, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an interesting case in which the logic of appropriateness intersects with the logic of consequences. The more consumers of companies' products, particularly in high-end markets, care about governance in areas of limited statehood including human rights and environmental standards (the logic of appropriateness), the more they use market mechanisms to induce firms to compliance with these norms (the logic of consequentialism). This then translates into reputational concerns for companies, particularly those with a brand name to defend. In these cases, local communities do not provide a shadow of hierarchy, but they expect from non-state actors -companies and NGOs alike -that they comply with local governance norms and that they contribute to the provision of collective goods, particularly when the central state institutions are too weak (or to corrupt) to govern. Non-compliance can then quickly become costly for the non-state actors, particularly when the multi-level nature of governance in areas of limited statehood comes into play. In many cases, local communities are well connected to transnational advocacy networks of NGOs and international organizations and, thus, can link up with global civil society (for these mechanisms see Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999 ). An exemplary case involved indigenous peoples in the Niger delta of Nigeria which linked up with the transnational human rights and environmental communities to denounce the behaviour of the Shell company which had both ruined the environment and had violated the human rights of local communities (Frynas 2000) . As a result of these campaigns, Shell today is a different company that has embraced the norms of "corporate social responsibility" even though compliance with these norms in the Niger delta is still disputed (Zimmer 2010; see above) . The example shows again how the norms of local communities and the social embeddedness of markets can work together to force non-state actors to contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood.
Conclusions
The argument of this paper can be summarized in the following points:
1. Areas of limited statehood characterized by a lack of domestic sovereignty of central state authorities are ubiquitous in the contemporary international system. Weak state capacities to enforce and implement rules and regulations also lack a "shadow of hierarchy." As a result, the governance problematique in areas of limited statehood is twofold: On the one hand, governance provided by various combinations of state and non-state, external and local actors has to substitute for the lack of "governance by government." On the other hand, functional equivalents for the shadow of hierarchy have to be present, too, in order to make these nonhierarchical modes of governance effective.
2. But it is wrong to equate limited domestic sovereignty per se with a lack of governance. Areas of limited statehood are not "un-governed" or even "un-governable." In fact, governance is sometimes provided even under rather adverse conditions of fragile or failing statehood. Under particular circumstances, non-state actors become "governors" in that they systematically engage in rule-making or the provision of collective goods. Governance without a state then depends on particular scope conditions as well as on both incentive structures and norms inducing non-state actors such as firms or even warlords and rebel groups to contribute to governance.
3. The state is not absent in areas of limited statehood, though. The debate is not between either governance by the state or the complete privatization of governance. Rather, central state authorities are still around in areas of limited statehood, even though they lack the ability to govern hierarchically. Most of the time, they are in a negotiation relationship with other actors, thereby either contributing to or hampering governance.
In conclusion, I would like to comment on the multi-level nature of governance in areas of limited statehood. To begin with, the international legal order has established standards of good governance including human rights, the rule of law, and the right to participate in governance, which deeply circumscribe the domestic sovereignty of states and include the subsidiary responsibility of the international community -be it states, international organizations, or non-state actorsto help in the governance of areas of limited statehood. In a way, international law already proscribes interference with the "Westphalian" sovereignty of states when it comes to areas of limited statehood. Note in this context that this interference in the internal affairs of states is not confined to military interventions for humanitarian purposes, but includes the subsidiary responsibility of the international community to provide governance (Ladwig and Rudolf 2011) .
However, attempts by the international community to export governance in areas of limited statehood are wedded to a global script. Most international donor agencies and most international state-building and democratization programs -from the World Bank to the European Union and the United States -presuppose that the modern Western nation-state is the model for "good governance" (see also Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009 for a comparison between US and EU democracy promotion programs). Underneath these programs and strategies are the assumptions of modernization theory that the modern state comes as a package consisting of an effective government, the rule of law, human rights, democracy, market economy, and some degree of social welfare. This package is now being applied to developing and transition countries as well as to failing and failed states. The maxim prevails in national and international development organizations that democratization, the building of democratic institutions, and economic liberalization must all happen at the same time in order to result in modernization. "State-building" constitutes part of the governance package that the international community tries to institute in failing or failed states. But the goal of these measures is always the same: the institutionalization of a fully consolidated, democratic, Western-style nation-state, as part and parcel of a "modernization package."
When these governance packages hit the local ground, they usually result in hybrid regimes and strange amalgamations of "modern" as well as "traditional" institutions," in shadow states, and in normative pluralism (Zürcher 2007; Kötter and Schuppert 2009) . They almost never result in a full-fledged modern and consolidated nation-state. As a result, multi-level governance in areas of limited statehood is very different from governance regimes such as the EU. The EU is highly regulated and the distribution of authority among and between levels is well defined. Such meta rules governing potential conflicts between the levels are mostly absent in areas of limited statehood in which the domestic sovereignty and more often than not the "Westphalian" sovereignty of states are compromised. As a result, we encounter normative pluralism in the absence of valid collision regimes. Western values and norms often clash head-on with local rules and traditions leading to various processes of adaptation and resistance.
Last not least, lines of accountability are often unclear in the multi-level governance systems of areas of limited statehood. E.g., despite all the rhetoric about "local ownership," international actors such as donor agencies and IOs, but also companies and NGOs are ultimately accountable to their respective principals in the countries of origin. This inevitably creates tension and conflict.
There is no easy way out and this paper has no ready-made solutions. But if I am right and limited domestic sovereignty is a fact of life in the contemporary international system, the governance package provided by the international community which assumes consolidated statehood and Western-style modernization, is deeply flawed. First, governance assistance rather than statebuilding should be the order of the day for areas of limited statehood (see Brozus 2011) . Second, the old slogan of the foreign aid community -help others to help themselves (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe) -ought to be resurrected. It requires first and foremost that governance assistance must pay close attention to local political, social, and cultural conditions rather than trying to implement a global template. This also requires thinking in terms of functional equivalents to Western institutions to
promote universal values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy.
